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Real business cycle (RBC) models (i.e. Kydland and Prescott, 1982) impose a strong discipline
on the choice of consumption and hours, both intertemporally and intratemporally. In these
models, the optimal choice of hours is determined in equilibrium such that the marginal rate
of substitution between consumption and leisure (mrs) is equal to the marginal productivity
of labor (mpl). However, the data tell that there is a substantial wedge between these two
quantities that strongly co-varies with the economic cycle. In their seminal work, Chari Kehoe
and McGrattan (2007) (henceforth CKM) conclude that, along with the e¢ ciency wedge, the
labor wedge accounts for most of the ￿ uctuations in output, putting it at the center of their
business cycle accounting research program.1
We interpret this ￿nding as an indication of a signi￿cant misspeci￿cation of the prototype
RBC model as it relates to the labor market. Search and matching frictions (Mortensen
and Pissarides 1994, Pissarides 2000) introduce a wedge between the wage and both the mpl
and the mrs, providing a natural framework to address misspeci￿cation related to the labor
market imperfections. It is indeed tempting to think that these type of frictions will induce
endogenous movements in the optimal choice of hours that could manifest themselves as labor
wedge. In this paper, we ￿rst present a model with labor market frictions￿ in the form of search
and matching￿ that nests a prototype RBC model a la CKM; then, we ask whether the labor
wedge, as usually measured, could be an artifact of these frictions and if so, to what extent.
We ￿nd that a model with Nash bargaining between the ￿rm and the marginal worker over
hours and wage alter the ￿rm￿ s perceived bene￿t of an additional hour at the intensive margin
(i.e. hours per employed worker), which is valued in terms of additional marginal output per
worker. However, given that search frictions are internalized at the wage bargaining stage
the equation that determines the labor wedge is not a⁄ected by search frictions directly or
explicitly. Nevertheless, since ￿ uctuations in total hours can now be attributed to both the
intensive and extensive margin, the marginal rate of substitution, and thus, the labor wedge
1The business cycle accounting research program has the goal of identifying promising modeling avenues
for dynamic general equilibrium models by measuring the "discrepancy" between the data and a prototype real
business cycle model. CKM identify four wedges: the e¢ ciency, labor, investment and government consumption
wedge. The labor and e¢ ciency wedges are considered the most important, suggesting that macro models that
would like to explain real macro ￿ uctuations should pay more attention to understanding what type of frictions
could manifest themselves as these wedges.
2di⁄er from the one implied by the prototype RBC model. It turns out that the modi￿cation is
in the right direction. That is, the labor wedge we obtain is less variable and procyclical than
the prototype labor wedge. This result is sensitive to the exact parameterization of the labor
supply elasticity. We ￿nd that, for instance, when the Frisch elasticity is relatively high, such
as 2.8, as in most macro models, we can get up to 20 percent decline in the variability of the
labor wedge. Similarly, we ￿nd a reduction in the procyclicality. This result is even stronger, a
40 percent reduction, for Frisch elasticities that are more consistent with the micro estimates.
We complement our results with a numerical exercise where we treat the search model as the
data generating process and describe the behavior of the labor wedge that an econometrician
would recover in doing business cycle accounting. Even though theoretically there is no labor
wedge in the simulated data, we show that one can falsely measure a signi￿cantly procyclical
and variable labor wedge if the underlying search frictions and the explicit distinction between
the intensive and the extensive margin is ignored in the measurement. About 15 percent of
the relative variation in the labor wedge and all its comovement with output and total hours
could be explained by this misspeci￿cation.
The next section discusses the related literature, especially that on the business cycle ac-
counting and the labor wedge. Section 3 presents the idea behind the business cycle accounting
exercise in CKM using U.S. data, and puts our following exercise in context. Section 4 presents
an extension of the prototype RBC model with search frictions and discusses how search fric-
tions imply a di⁄erent labor wedge. Section 5 shows, quantitatively, how search frictions alter
the measured wedge, ￿rst by using the U.S. data and focusing on only one equilibrium con-
dition, then by using the model generated data and analyzing the behavior of labor wedge in
these simulations. Section 6 concludes.
2 Related Literature
This paper is part of the vast literature that studies labor market imperfections in connection
with the business cycle, such as in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), Cole and Rogerson (1999),
and Shimer (2005), among others. However, the extension of the standard growth model we
use is most closely related to Andolfatto (1996) and Merz (1995, 1999), which embed search
3frictions into an otherwise standard RBC model.
The focus on the labor wedge makes the paper naturally related to the recent literature
on business cycle accounting, which, in di⁄erent forms, dates back before CKM.2 For example,
Hall (1997) identi￿es variations in the marginal rate of substitution as an important element
to explain aggregate ￿ uctuations. Several other studies in the literature focused on the same
equilibrium condition in the labor market and provided di⁄erent interpretations of it, ranging
from changes in labor market institutions, competitive structure of the economy, price-wage
markup, changes in regulation, and tax policy (see in particular, Cole and Ohanian 2002,
Gali, Gertler and Lopez-Salido 2007, Mulligan 2002, Rotemberg and Woodford 1991 and 1999).
Chang and Kim (2007), on the other hand, argues that the apparent distortion in the labor
market clearing condition as measured in the aggregate data might be partly due to aggregation
bias. They show that a heterogenous-agent economy with incomplete capital markets and
indivisible labor can generate this observed wedge. Arseneau and Chugh (2010) also anlayze
a general equilibrium matching model with distortions that map into a measured labor wedge.
Even though the focus is on optimal tax policy, they show that, as in our paper, labor wedge
takes two di⁄erent forms with matching frictions, one intratemporal and one intertemporal.
More recently, Blanchard and Gali (2010), Cheremukhin and Restrepo-Echavarria (2010)
and Shimer (2009, 2010) focus on the variation in the labor wedge. Shimer (2009) reviews
the literature and makes a case for focusing the attention on the labor wedge, as it is rela-
tively immune to how the model environment is speci￿ed and the expectations are formed.
Cheremukhin and Restrepo-Echavarria (2010) lays out an RBC model with search frictions and
argues that most of the variation in the labor wedge is attributable to the residual shock to
matching e¢ ciency, rather than variations in job destruction or impediments to the bargaining
process. Both Blanchard and Gali (2010) and Shimer (2010), di⁄er in their formulation of
the search frictions from us, and derive a neutrality result. This result basically implies that
￿ uctuations in the unemployment rate are independent of the aggregate productivity. In Blan-
chard and Gali (2010), this is due to fact that recruitment of ￿rms is not a⁄ected by aggregate
productivity. As Shimer (2010) argues, this follows when one assumes that recruitment is only
2One can trace the basic idea behind this exercise to early work in the RBC literature as in Prescott (1986)
or Ingram, Kocherlakota and Savin (1994).
4labor-intensive, not good-intensive. We favor a more traditional approach, as in Andolfatto
(1996) and Merz (1995), and model recruitment as a good-intensive technology. Hence ￿rms
respond to productivity shocks by increasing recruitment during booms. We ￿nd it reasonable
to assume that, at least partially, ￿rms cannot just bear the cost of recruitment by costlessly
switching workers from production to recruitment in response to productivity shocks.
3 The Prototype Real Business Cycle Model
In this section we present a prototype business cycle model with perfectly competitive factor
markets. As we will see, when the model is taken to the data, the theoretical prediction that the
marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure has to be equal to the marginal
productivity of labor does not hold. Following the literature, we name this discrepancy labor
wedge.
The economy is populated by a continuum of mass 1 of identical households solving a
dynamic optimization problem over the choices of consumption (ct), savings (xt) and hours
worked (ht). Markets are complete and household utility function is separable in consumption




￿t[U (ct) +  G(ht)]; 0 < ￿ < 1; (1)
where ￿ is the subjective discount factor, ct is consumption and ht is per capita hours worked
in period t. Households earn wages wt and receive rental income, rt, from capital that they
rent out to ￿rms. They can invest xt units each period which adds to new capital next period,
kt+1, net of depreciation, ￿. Wedges operate as a tax, following CKM we introduce a tax on
investment and labor earnings, [1 + "x;t] and [1 ￿ "l;t], respectively. Finally, in each period,
households also receive a lump sum transfer, Tt, from government. Let Wh(￿) and Wf(￿)
denote the value functions for households and ￿rms respectively. Then, we can summarize the
household optimization problem as follows
3Usual restricions on the functional form apply, that is Uc (c) > 0, Ucc (c) ￿ 0, Gh(h) < 0, and Ghh(h) ￿ 0
as well as usual Inada conditions. In addition, we normalize G(0) = 0 and impose G(h) < 0, 8h > 0.
5Wh(!t) = max
ct;kt+1;xt;lt
fU (ct) +  G(ht) + ￿EtWh(!t+1j!t)g (2)
s:t: ct + xt [1 + "x;t] = wt [1 ￿ "l;t]ht + rtkt + Tt (3)
kt+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)kt + xt (4)
where !t = fkt;￿tg is the set of individual and aggregate state variables, respectively. Optimal-
ity requires the net wage to be equal to the marginal rate of substitution between consumption
and leisure, mrs; given that all households are identical, this condition becomes the relevant
labor supply schedule
[1 ￿ "l;t]wt = ￿ Gh(ht)=Uc (ct) ￿ mrst:
Firms hire workers and capital to produce according to a neoclassical production function
"z;tf(kt;lt), where "z;t is the exogenous productivity shock (or e¢ ciency wedge) and l represents
total hours demanded by the ￿rm, the product of hours per worker h and employment n. For
future comparison we also write down the static ￿rm optimization in a consistent way.
Wf(!t) = max
kt;ht;nt
f"z;tf(kt;htnt) ￿ wthtnt ￿ rktg (5)
Optimality requires the wage to be equal to the marginal productivity of labor. Given that all
￿rms are identical, this condition becomes the relevant labor demand schedule4
wt = "z;tfl(kt;lt) ￿ mplt:
Finally, we assume that the government runs a balanced budget in each period such that
tax revenues are equal to government spending Tt + xt"x;t + wtlt"l;t = "g;t.
In equilibrium we assume that the labor market is always at full employment, nt = 1; hence,
we can replace hours per worker with total hours ht = lt.5 The following conditions describe
4Notice that once the marginal productivity of labor is equal to the wage, the ￿rm is also indi⁄erent between
the extensive and intensive margin.
5It is worth noting that the household problem could be recast in terms of a big family that equalizes
consumption across its members and maximizes the momentary utility function U (ct) +  ntG(ht). In the
6the competitive equilibrium
Uc(ct)[1 + "x;t] = ￿Et[Uc(ct+1)["z;t+1fk(kt+1;lt+1) + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 + "x;t+1)]j!t] (6)
mrst(lt) = ￿ Gh(lt)=Uc (ct) = mplt [1 ￿ "l;t] (7)
"z;tf(kt;lt) = ct + kt+1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)kt + "g;t (8)
along with a set of unique realizations for the vector of exogenous process "t = ["x;t;"l;t;"z;t;
"g;t]. Notice that the equation that describes the labor market equilibrium is static and is the
only one where "l;t appears. Under various functional forms￿ and once a parametrization is
chosen￿ using data on output (yt), total hours (lt), and consumption (ct) is enough to pin down
a unique value for the labor tax rate "l;t. If the actual labor tax rate does not vary substantially
at business cycle frequency, [1￿"l;t] can be interpreted as a discrepancy between the model and
the data: a labor wedge (Shimer 2009). While we do not attempt to draw causal implication as
in CKM, we analyze the statistical properties of the labor wedge in relation to business cycles.
Figure (1) plots [1 ￿ "l;t] over the period 1959:I to 20010:III. The labor wedge seems to have a
low frequency movement, which might be explained by changes in the taxes (see for instance,
Ohanian, Rogerson and Ra⁄o, 2008) or changes in the composition of the workforce and the
resulting imperfect household aggregation over-time (Cociuba and Ueberfeldt, 2010). However,
at the business cycle frequency, there is a lot of variation in the measured labor wedge that is
highly unlikely to be explained by high-frequency changes in labor tax. Moreover, the ￿gure
con￿rms the well known result that the labor wedge, [1 ￿ "l;t], is pro-cyclical (falling during
recessions) and is positively correlated with per capita hours worked.
In the next section we explore how a model with frictions in the labor market and with an
extensive and intensive labor margin can help explain the observed discrepancy between the
marginal rate of substitution and the marginal productivity of labor.
budget constraint, labor income would be (1 ￿ "t)wtnth with the additional constraint nt ￿ 1. In general, the
full employment constraint would be binding and, thus, we would have the same equilibrium conditions shown
in the text. In the next section we will make explicit use of this setting.
7Figure 1: Historical realizations of [1 ￿ "lt] according to measurement equation (7) and data on
yt, ct, and lt over the period 1959:1 to 2010:III. Shaded areas indicate NBER recession dates.
4 Introducing Search Frictions and Employment Fluctuations
The model economy is almost identical to the one presented in the preceding section except
for the presence of search and matching frictions in the labor market, and movements in both
the intensive and the extensive margin for labor. In other words, even though goods and
capital are exchanged in perfectly competitive markets, labor market imperfections allow for
unemployment. The model is a decentralized version of Andolfatto (1996) and Merz (1995)
and is laid out such that it looks similar to the prototype real business cycle (RBC) model
previously described. Search frictions in the model are summarized at an aggregate level by
an aggregate matching function and require households and ￿rms to determine employment
contracts through Nash bargaining. We ￿rst provide the details of the problem for households
and ￿rms and then discuss the Nash bargaining outcome.
84.1 Households
The economy is populated by a continuum of in￿nitely-lived worker-households distributed
uniformly along the unit interval implying a constant labor force normalized to one. At any
point in time, only a mass nt ￿ 1 of households is employed while the remaining 1￿nt households
are unemployed and searching for a job. Each household has the same utility function as in
the previous section. Markets are complete providing perfect insurance against unemployment
risk, hence, consumption is equalized across households (Andolfatto 1996 and Merz 1995). It
is easy to prove that we can recast the problem in terms of a representative household that




￿t[U (ct) +  ntG(ht)]; 0 < ￿ < 1: (9)
The objective function of the representative household di⁄ers from the one of the prototype
model because it explicitly takes into account the possibility that employment may vary over
time￿ when nt ￿ 1 we are back to the perfectly competitive model.6 Each unemployed worker
exerts some e⁄ort, et, to ￿nd a job, which costs c(et) units of resources.7 As a result, the
budget constraint of the representative households can be written as
ct + xt [1 + ￿x;t] + c(et)(1 ￿ nt) = wt [1 ￿ ￿l;t]ntht + rtkt + Tt (10)
Note that ￿l is the analog of "l in the prototype model, i.e. the fraction of labor earnings net
of taxes.
Given the complete markets assumption, it is easy to write the law of motion for aggregate
capital
Kt+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)Kt + Xt 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1: (11)
When households solve their problems, they are going to take wage, wt, and hours worked
ht as given, as they will be determined through Nash Bargaining (see next section). We assume
that trade in the labor market is mediated by an aggregate matching function that determines
6Notice that we have made use of the normalization G(0) = 0. Hence the term (1 ￿ nt) G(0) does not
explicitely appear in the objective function.
7Cost of search function, c(e); is assumed to be strictly convex and increasing in e.
9the number of jobs formed in each period as a function of the number of job vacancies, Vt; and
the aggregate search e⁄ort of the household/workers, (1 ￿ Nt)Et
Mt = ￿￿;tV
￿
t [(1 ￿ Nt)Et]
1￿￿ (12)
where 0 < ￿ < 1, ￿￿;t is the period-t realization of a process that governs the e¢ ciency of
matching, and the following intuitive restriction applies Mt ￿ minfVt;1 ￿ Ntg. Using the de￿-
nition of the matching function, we can write the probability of ￿nding a job for an unemployed
worker as pt = Mt
(1￿Nt)Et, which is taken as given at household level.
Job matches that are formed in a period are assumed to become productive in the following
period. That is, they only increase employment with a one-period lag. As jobs are created,
they are also being destroyed. Letting ￿ denote the period-t fraction of existing jobs destroyed,
the law of motion for employment is given by the expression
Nt+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)Nt + Mt; (13)
where ￿ 2 [0;1]. At the household level, employment nt evolves endogenously according to the
following, slightly modi￿ed equation of motion
nt+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)nt + pt(1 ￿ nt)et: (14)
Let￿ s de￿ne the aggregate productivity shock, ￿z;t as the analog of "z;t. We can ￿nally
write down the representative household problem recursively
Wh(!h
t ) = max
xt;et
fU (ct) +  ntG(ht) + ￿EtWh(!h
t+1j!h
t )g (15)
s:t: ct + xt [1 + ￿x;t] + c(et)(1 ￿ nt) = wt [1 ￿ ￿l;t]ntht + rtkt + Tt (16)
nt+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)nt + pt(1 ￿ nt)et
kt+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)kt + xt
10taking wt = w(￿t); rt = r(￿t), pt = p(￿t), and equations of motion for aggregate state
variables, Kt and Nt as given. For notational simplicity, let !h
t = fkt;nt;￿tg and ￿t =
f￿t;Kt;Ntg denote individual and aggregate state variables for the household, respectively, with
￿t = [￿l;t;￿x;t;￿z;t;￿g;t;￿{;t] being the vector of exogenous processes analogous to "t. This
optimization problem leads to two conditions that determine the optimal savings and search
e⁄ort recursively for the large household (details are in the appendix):
Uc(ct)[1 + ￿x;t] = ￿Et
h








Uc(ct+1)[wt+1 [1 ￿ ￿l;t+1]ht+1 + c(et+1)]+
 G(ht+1) +
Uc(ct+1)ce(et+1)





The ￿rst Euler equation is the standard consumption Euler equation. The second Euler equation
determines the households￿optimal search behavior. The left-hand side in (18) is the expected
marginal cost of search for the households in current consumption units, which should be equal
to the expected marginal gains from search on the right-hand side. If search is successful, the
household expects to get utility from the net wage payments, wt+1 [1 ￿ ￿l;t+1]ht+1, and from
economizing on future search costs, c(et+1); and to get disutility from working G(ht+1). The
￿nal term in brackets represents the net future bene￿t arising from the expected persistence
of a job match.8 Note that the household decision for optimal saving is exactly identical to
the one in the competitive model (equation 6). Hence, all things equal, labor market frictions
do not a⁄ect the wedge between marginal utility of consumption and the expected real rate
of return on capital in the model. Instead, labor market frictions a⁄ect the search behavior,
hence the labor supply decision. Next we turn to the demand side and describe ￿rms￿problems.
4.2 Firms
As in the previous section, ￿rms operate a constant returns to scale production function,
￿z;tf(kt;ntht) However, while capital is rented in a perfectly competitive market, ￿rms must
8Given that any single current-period match survives with probability 1 ￿ ￿, households￿expected utility
will increase simply by reducing expected future recruiting costs by the quantity
Uc(ct+1)ce(et+1)
pt+1 (1 ￿ ￿). The
second term in this sum, ￿pt+1et+1
Uc(ct+1)ce(et+1)
pt+1 , represents the reduction in the future job-￿nding rate, due
to the current depletion of the unemployment stock.
11undergo a costly search process before jobs are created and output is produced. For each job
vacancy created in period-t, ￿rms pay ￿ units of output resulting in period-t ￿vacancy-posting￿
costs of ￿vt. Jobs must be posted as vacancies before they can be ￿lled. We assume that
vacancies adjust in equilibrium such that the value of an additional vacancy is driven to zero.
We are going to approach the ￿rms￿problem in two steps. In the ￿rst step, ￿rms decide how
much capital to rent and how many jobs to create taking the rental rate rt, aggregate state
variables, the labor contract fwt;htg, and the probability of ￿lling a vacancy, qt; as given9
Wf(!
f
t ) = max
kt;vt;nt+1





such that f(kt;ntht) = k￿
t (ntht)(1￿￿) (20)
nt+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)nt + qtvt
where !
f






Firms￿problem in (19) implies a set of ￿rst order conditions that determines the optimal level
of capital stock rented and the number of vacancies posted by ￿rms.













The ￿rst condition is the familiar relation between the rental rate and the marginal product
of capital. The second condition determines the optimal number of vacancies posted by ￿rms.
It implies that the marginal cost of ￿lling a vacancy should be equal to the marginal bene￿t,
in expectation. Since each vacancy costs ￿ and the duration of a vacancy is expected to be
1=qt, ￿
qt gives the expected marginal cost of ￿lling one vacancy. On the right hand side, we see
how each additional ￿lled job produces its marginal product next period net of wage payments,
while the third term represents the expected saving in terms of future recruitment costs.
9From the aggregate matching function in (12), we know that the probability of ￿lling a vacancy must be
qt = Mt=Vt.
124.3 Employment Contract and the Nash Bargaining
Since negotiating a wage has an implicit opportunity cost due to search frictions, we need a
mechanism to determine the surplus for each contracting party. It is standard in the search
literature to use generalized Nash bargaining for this purpose (see for instance, Pissarides 2000).
We follow the same approach and assume that each worker￿ s employment contract, fwt;htg,
is determined through Nash bargaining between the ￿rm and the household. In a setting like
this, where there are multiple workers within a ￿rm, it is not entirely clear how to formulate
the bargaining problem. Fortunately, Stole and Zwiebel (1996) show that bargaining should
happen over the marginal surplus for both parties.10 11 Assuming that households (￿rms) have








nt(!t) is the household￿ s net marginal surplus from having one more worker employed
given the household￿ s optimal behavior, and W
f
nt(!t) is the ￿rm￿ s net marginal surplus from
having one more employee given ￿rm￿ s optimal behavior. As long as each party can extract
some surplus, i.e. Wh
nt(!t) > 0 and W
f
nt(!t) > 0, this Nash bargaining problem yields two
conditions that determine equilibrium level of hours, ht, and wage per hour, wt (details of the
solution are presented in the Appendix)
￿Wh
n(!t) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿l;t)Uc(ct)Wf
n(!t) = 0 (24)
Uc(ct)[1 ￿ ￿l;t][￿z;tfl(kt;ntht) + ￿z;tfll(kt;ntht)ntht] +  Gh(ht) = 0 (25)
Equation (24) is the starting point to determine the hourly wage and basically divides the total
surplus of the marginal match among the household and the ￿rm. Notice that ￿l;t exogenously
reduces the household￿ s share of surplus and, at the limit ￿l;t = 1; the household￿ s surplus is
zero Wh
nt = 0: Household risk aversion adds a time-varying dimension to the sharing rule: in
10For examples see Merz (1995), Beauchemin and Tasci (2008), Fujita and Nakajima (2009), and Elsby and
Micheals (2010), among others.
11Implicitly, we assume that the contracted hours apply to every worker. However, given that G(￿) is convex,
it is easy to prove that homogenous hours minimize the overall worker disutility.






13times of high marginal utility households claim a relatively higher surplus. Equation (25) is
the ￿rst order condition with respect to hours, as we will see this equation will play a crucial
role in the analysis of the labor wedge. Those last two conditions complete the necessary set of
equations that fully characterize the equilibrium. Next, we combine these set of conditions to
describe the recursive competitive equilibrium.
4.4 Equilibrium
Since all households and ￿rms are identical, in equilibrium, individually e¢ cient allocations
coincide with the aggregate, i.e. kt = Kt, ct = Ct, lt = Lt, nt = Nt, therefore the relevant
state is ￿t. Then the competitive equilibrium of this economy is characterized by a list, kt(￿t);
lt(￿t); ct(￿t); nt(￿t); wt(￿t); rt(￿t) that satisfy equilibrium conditions implied by household
and ￿rm optimization (17-18) and (21-22), Nash bargaining (24) and (25), as well as equations
of motion for aggregate states, (11) and (13).13 It is also possible to pin down the aggregate
resource constraint by exploiting the free entry condition for ￿rms which imposes that all the
￿ ow pro￿ts net of recruitment expenses are exhausted in equilibrium
yt = ct + xt + "g;t + ￿vt + c(et)(1 ￿ nt)
Note that, search frictions do not a⁄ect the consumption Euler equation and the resource
constraint in a signi￿cant way.14 However, ￿ uctuations in the extensive and intensive margin,
along with the search decision give rise to additional equilibrium conditions for employment,
search e⁄ort, et, and job vacancies, vt, that are absent in the prototype business cycle model.
For the purpose of this paper, we can focus our analysis on the static equilibrium conditions
that describe the labor wedge (25) and (24).
13There is a possibility of multiple steady state equilibria in this model due to the complementarities between
￿rms￿recruitment e⁄ort and workers￿search e⁄ort. Intuitively, if ￿rms expect that workers will not search as
hard, the returns to ￿rms￿recruitment will diminish, hence the number of vacancies posted. This will in turn
provide workers with the incentive to search less, thereby ful￿lling ￿rms￿expectations in the ￿rst place. However,
one can show that given constant returns to scale of the matching function and assuming enough convexity in
c(e), we will have a unique steady state equilibrium in this model. We calibrate the model such that c(e) has
enough convexity in the numerical exercises.
14At least quantitatively for the resource constraint, since most calibrations does not imply big search costs
relative to output.
144.5 The Wage Determination
It is possible to derive an explicit wage equation using the equilibrium conditions from household





















The wage bill for an additional worker wtht is a function of the marginal productivity of employ-
ment, ￿z;tfn(kt;lt), search frictions and the extensive marginal rate of substitution,￿ G(ht)=Uc(ct);
which re￿ ects, at the social level, the marginal disutility of an additional worker, ￿ G(ht); for
any given h. It is useful to introduce the mrs and mpl by noting that ￿ G(ht)=Uc(ct) =
mrstht￿(ht), with ￿t = G(ht)=[htGh(ht)] 2 [0;1], and the marginal productivity of employment
￿z;tfn(kt;lt) = mpltht. We can thus rewrite the wage equation in a compact form
wt = (1 ￿ ￿)mplt + ￿
mrst
1 ￿ ￿l;t
￿t + ￿t=ht: (27)
where ￿t 7 0 is the only term that involves search frictions explicitly.15 If we combine the wage
equation (27) with the condition on hours, equation (25), we can relate both the mrst and the
mplt to the wage
wt = mplt[1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿tsL









where we have introduced the output elasticity to total hours sL
t = 1 +
fll(kt;lt)lt
fl(kt;lt) 2 [0;1], which
is approximately the labor share.16 Those two equations are very instructive and resemble
the labor supply and labor demand equations of the perfectly competitive model. However,
search frictions coupled with Nash bargaining introduce two time varying wedges between the
wage and both the marginal productivity of labor and the marginal rate of substitution. In







pt cet(et)]: Notice that
its sign is ambiguos in principle, in fact, we have ￿ > 0 when ￿ = 0 and ￿ < 0 when ￿ = 1.
16In the search model, due to the search frictions s
L is not exactly the labor share￿ while it is in the perfectly
competitive model.
15fact, even if ￿l;t were constant, the wage would not perfectly co-vary with the mpl and the
mrs over the cycle, being a⁄ected by movements in the search frictions ￿t and in the way the
match surplus is split. In general, the wage will be between the mrs and the mpl, however,
when ￿ is small, it might be possible to observe wt > mplt. In part this is due to the presence
of sL
t which reduces the ￿rm￿ s perceived bene￿t of labor. In fact, ￿rms value the bene￿t of
increasing hours worked h across workers in terms of its e⁄ect on the marginal productivity of
an extra worker (not in terms of the average worker productivity). However, while the cost is
still linear in h, the marginal productivity of employment is not: as long as there is curvature in
the production function, i.e., sL < 1, the marginal productivity of employment increases with
h less than one-to-one.
Finally, it is also interesting to note that the ￿rm bargaining power parameter, ￿, is inversely
related to the wage and enters symmetrically in both equations (28) and (29). As we will see,
this implies that the bargaining power per se does not a⁄ect the labor wedge, as long as there
is an interior solution of the Nash Bargaining problem, i.e., ￿ 2 (0;1).
In the following section we describe in more detail our labor wedge and compare it with the
one of the competitive model.
4.6 The Labor Wedge
Eliminating the wage from (28) and (29) we have an expression that is analogous to the one of
the perfectly competitive model (equation 7).
mrst = mplt [1 ￿ ￿l;t]sL
t (30)
It is striking that while the bargaining process has created a wedge between mrs and mpl, search
frictions per se do not appear directly in this equation. Mechanically, this is simply because
they enter symmetrically and additively in the labor demand and supply equations, hence, when
those are equated search frictions perfectly o⁄set and cancel out. The same is true also for ￿
and ￿ which a⁄ect mrs and mpl exactly in the same proportion. Intuitively, one reason for this
result is that the bargaining process internalizes search frictions through the wage rather than
hours. In part this may be due to the fact that search frictions are inherently intertemporal￿
16i.e. it takes time and resources to match unemployed workers with vacant positions￿ while the
labor wedge is inherently intratemporal. The e⁄ects of intertemporal frictions are absorbed by
movements in the wage and the extensive margin, and not in the labor wedge.
In order to understand the e⁄ects of search frictions on the extensive margin, it is crucial
to observe that the variation in this margin is governed by mainly two decisions: workers￿
search e⁄ort and ￿rms￿vacancy posting decision. Optimality conditions for search e⁄ort and
vacancies (see equations 18 and 22) along with the law of motion for employment will govern
the movements at the extensive margin. Using equations (18) and (22), noting that the terms
in expectations are each party￿ s marginal surplus from a match, one can write down a simple
















Variations in the relative values of expected surpluses will determine ￿ uctuations in market
tightness, ￿t, and et, implying ￿ uctuations in employment. Note also that the Nash bargaining




all t (see equation 24). Once this is taken into account, it is easy to see how fundamental
parameters related to search frictions explicitly a⁄ect the movements in the extensive margin











Equation (32) shows, how the labor wedge (that will be pinned down by equation 34 below)
a⁄ects the cost of searching and, thus, employment ￿ uctuations. In turn, since the employment
law of motion has to hold, movements in the labor wedge will probably induce ￿ uctuations in
the matching function process, ￿￿, interpretable as the extensive labor wedge. We leave the
study of the extensive wedge to future work and focus on the static labor wedge instead.
Going back to the static condition (30), one can see that the only distortion present, sum-
17This is similar to the ￿ intertemporal labor wedge￿derived by Arseneau and Chugh (2010).
17marized by sL
t , is induced by the bargaining problem. However, once we assume that the
production function takes a Cobb-Douglas form, such that fll(k;l)l = ￿￿fl(k;l), the marginal
productivity of workers change one-to-one with h, we have that sL
t = 1 ￿ ￿. Hence, the wedge
introduced by sL
t is irrelevant at business cycle frequency. The constant (1 ￿ ￿) acts like a tax
on employment, which, in this context, is observationally equivalent to a labor income tax; in
the baseline calibration ￿ takes a value of about 0.35 reducing substantially the steady state
value required for ￿l.18
We can ￿nally compare the two fundamental equations that are used to back out the labor
wedge from the data in the competitive and non-competitive labor market model


















The major di⁄erence between the prototype labor wedge [1 ￿ "l;t] and ours is that in the
perfectly competitive RBC model, the lack of distinction between the extensive and intensive
margin has induced the use of total hours worked in the evaluation of the mrs instead of hours
per worker. Intuitively, the presence of nt in the prototype labor wedge equation may introduce
a strongly procyclical element￿ given that Gh > 0. Employment is instead not present in
the second equation when we back out our discrepancy, [1 ￿ ￿l;t]. Since movements in both
margins are not equally signi￿cant in deriving the business cycle frequency ￿ uctuations in total
hours, this distinction about the intensive-extensive margin is clearly important. Figure (2)
shows the decomposition of total hours into its components. Total hours in the U.S. is clearly
procyclical. When total hours is assumed to follow a path where one of the margins is ￿xed
at its historical average and the other margin is assumed to follow the actual path in the data,
one recognizes the well-known fact that most of the ￿ uctuations in total hours comes from the
extensive margin, not the intensive margin (Shimer 2009). This stylized fact is particularly
relevant when interpreting the results of our exercise.
To see why this might a⁄ect the measured labor wedge, consider a simple constant Frisch
18While a di⁄erent functional form for the production function would imply a time-varying s
L, we do not
believe that this will much help in explaining the cyclical properties of the labor wedge.
18Figure 2: Total Hours decomposition into hours per worker versus employment. Plots for only
employment and hours are generated, keeping the respective margin moving where the other
margin is assumed to be ￿xed at the historical average. Shaded areas indicate NBER recession
dates.
elasticity utility function of the form G(x) = ￿x(1+￿)=(1 + ￿). Then we can write a simple
relation describing the mapping between [1 ￿ "l;t] and [1 ￿ ￿l;t]
[1 ￿ "l;t] = (1 ￿ ￿l;t)(1 ￿ ￿)n
￿
t (35)
This shows how some of the observed procyclicality of [1 ￿ "l;t] induced by employment does
not have to be present in our labor wedge. In other words, even if we could interpret all the
movements in ￿l as due to actual changes in labor tax, equation (35) suggests that we would
still ￿nd a strongly procyclical labor wedge [1 ￿ "l;t] in the prototype model merely because of
procycilcal employment ￿ uctuations in the data￿ the higher ￿ the stronger the procyclicality.
5 Results
In this section we present the results of our quantitative experiments. The labor wedge is a
reduced form expression of a model￿ s inability to explain the data. Ideally, we would like to have
19a truly exogenous and small wedge, that, excluding tax movements, behaves as a measurement
error. In the ￿rst part of the quantitative exercise, we compare the behavior and statistical
properties of the labor wedge in the prototype model with the one in the search model using
U.S. data. We show that we can account for somewhere between 15 to more than 40 percent
of the ￿ uctuations in the prototype labor wedge. Next, we generate arti￿cial data from our
model and compute the labor wedge as in CKM. In this experiment we show that even though
the data-generating process does not have an exogenous labor wedge￿ we shut down ￿l￿ the
econometrician would still measure a strongly procyclical labor wedge as in CKM.
5.1 Mapping the Models to the U.S. Data
As we mentioned in previous sections, employment ￿ uctuations make the measurement of the
prototype mrs di⁄er from the one in our search model. This di⁄erence is crucial for the labor
wedge, because most of its variation is associated with mrs and not mpl ￿ uctuations. Figure
(3) plots the log-detrended mrs and mpl jointly with the log detrended prototype labor wedge.
In line with the model, the log mrs, mpl, and [1 ￿ "l;t] has been detrended by subtracting
the HP-trend of the log of consumption, output, and consumption-output ratio, respectively.19
While some low-frequency movements in the labor wedge may be driven by the mpl, particularly
between 1982-90, most of the business cycle movements are largely due to ￿ uctuations in the
mrs. Hence, seen from the lens of the perfectly competitive model, labor supply is less than
implied by the model during expansions and it does not fall as much as required by the model
during recessions. Given that the search labor wedge de￿ned in (30) basically modi￿es the mrs
reducing its procyclicality, as we have explained in the example in (35), the search model points
in the right direction.
Quantitative Analysis We recover the labor wedge in the prototype model (the proto-
type labor wedge) and in the model with labor market search frictions (search labor wedge),
from equations (33) and (34), respectively. Conducting this partial accounting exercise requires
us to calibrate the disutility of labor, G(￿), ￿, and  . We use quite a general functional form for,
G(￿), that has non-constant Frisch elasticity of substitution: G(x) = [(1 ￿ x)(1￿￿) ￿ 1]=(1 ￿ ￿).
19The calibration strictly follows the one of CKM. Series are demeaned for ease of comparison.
20Figure 3: De-meaned log-detrended mrs, mpl and the prototype labor wedge, [1 ￿ "l;t]. They
are detrended by subtracting the HP-￿lter trend of log(ct), log(yt) and log(ct=yt) respectively.
Shaded areas indicate NBER recession dates.
The often used CRRA form G(x) = ￿x1+￿=(1 + ￿) delivers fairly similar results. Given the
chosen form for G(￿), and restricting our analysis to models that allow for a balanced growth
path U(ct) = log(ct), we can write down two equations that implicitly de￿ne the prototype and
search labor wedge20
 ct
(1 ￿ lt)￿ =
yt
lt







(1 ￿ ￿)2(1 ￿ ￿l;t) (37)
Data on yt, lt;ht and ct pin down a unique labor wedge for each period in both equations once
we calibrate ￿, ￿ (e ￿), and   (e  ). We choose ￿ = 0:35 to match the average labor share in the
prototype model. Turning to preferences, we set the parameter   (e  ) such that in steady state
"l (￿l) is 0.4, consistent with the tax wedge measured by Prescott (2004). Finally, we adjust
￿, to get the same steady state labor elasticity in both models. In the baseline calibration we
20The same parameter, e.g.,  , will take di⁄erent values when calibrated in one of the two models. With a
loose notation, we denote with a   (e  ) the parameter value calibrated for the perfectly competitive model (labor
search model).
21Figure 4: Prototype and search mrs and respective labor wedges, [1 ￿ "l;t] and [1 ￿ ￿l;t], where
Frisch elasticity is around 2:8. Detrending uses HP-￿lter trend of log(ct) for mrs and log(ct=yt)
for labor wedges. Shaded areas indicate NBER recession dates.
choose the limiting case, ￿ = 1, which is also used by CKM and implies a steady state Frisch
elasticity of about 2.8, then, in order to get the same elasticity in the search model, we set
e ￿= 0:6. (Next we will explore a lower elasticity case).
Figure (4) shows the results for the ￿ low-frequency case￿when variables are detrended using
HP-trends in output and consumption￿ low-frequency movements are not necessarily ￿ltered
out. The upper panel presents the mrs for both models while the lower panel shows the related
wedges. There is a clear low-frequency cycle in the wedges, mainly due to the mpl, that has
not been captured by the trend in the consumption-labor ratio. The rise in the labor wedge
in the second half of the sample is due to a declining mpl, whether we assume competitive
labor markets or not. As suggested by Figure (4), the search labor wedge is less volatile
than the prototype labor wedge, by about 23 percent (see Table 1). This is entirely due to our
measurement of the mrs, which is about 40 percent less volatile than the mrs measured through
(36). This obviously follows from the fact that the intensive margin is the less variable margin
in total hours, which makes the measurement of the mrs in the search model less variable than
22the one of the prototype model.
Table 1: Moments for High Frisch Elasticity (2.78)




Std. Dev. 0.015 0.015 0.012 0.013 0.010
(0:015) (0:074) (0:057) (0:024) (0:014)
Corr(xt;xt￿1) 0.862 0.749 0.666 0.893 0.865
(0:862) (0:988) (0:983) (0:966) (0:922)
Cross Correlations
Yt Lt C=Y
[1 ￿ "l;t] 0:514 0.866 ￿0:162
(0:183) (0:992) (￿0:086)
[1 ￿ ￿l;t] 0.410 0.796 ￿0:043
(0:173) (0:978) (￿0:066)
All variables are HP-￿ltered, except Lt.
Moments in () are for the ￿ low-frequency￿case.
As shown in Table 1 the correlations of the labor wedge with cyclical variables are substan-
tially di⁄erent from zero (excluding the consumption-output ratio). Results are particularly
evident at business cycle frequency￿ in this case each variable in Table 1, but Lt, has been HP-
￿ltered (shown in Figure 5). Given a relatively high Frisch elasticity (about 2.78), at business
cycle frequency the search labor wedge is 20 percent less volatile than the prototype wedge (see
Table 1). As in the low-frequency case, the nature of the decline stems from the measurement
of the mrs. Moreover, the correlation with total hours is reduced by about 8 percent while
the one with output by 20 percent.
While the calibration of ￿ and   has no implication for our analysis, results are clearly
a⁄ected by the choice of the parameter that governs the Frisch elasticity ￿. So far, the Frisch
elasticity we have used in the numerical exercises was 2.78, in line with most macro model and
chosen to be comparable with CKM. However, this elasticity is at the high end of the estimates
23Figure 5: Prototype and search mrs and respective labor wedges, [1 ￿ "l;t] and [1 ￿ ￿l;t] where
Frisch elasticity is around 2:8: All expressed as deviations from their respective HP-￿lter trend.
Shaded areas indicate NBER recession dates.
found in the micro literature (Blundell and MaCurdy 1999). In what follows we will show that
our results are indeed ampli￿ed when the Frisch elasticity is chosen consistent with most of the
micro estimates.
Low Frisch Elasticity The major problem behind the failure of the prototype model, as
well as our extension of it, is that hours do not vary as much in the data as implied by our
models. This has been well-recognized in the context of macro models. Higher aggregate
micro elasticities tend to produce smaller wedges at the expense of a large micro literature that
argues for lower individual labor elasticities. Here, we replicate our exercise by targeting a
Frisch elasticity of 0.5 on average, which is more in line with these studies. Figures (6), (7)
and Table 2 present our results.21
While the overall volatility is higher across variables, there is a dramatic reduction in the
volatility of the labor wedge with search frictions of more than 40 percent, both at low frequency
(Figure 6) and at business cycle frequency (Figure 7). Once again, this reduction is entirely
21This requires ￿ = 5:54 in (36) and ￿ = 3:33 in (37) for the given sample averages of L and h.
24Figure 6: Prototype and search mrs and respective labor wedges, [1 ￿ "l;t] and [1 ￿ ￿l;t] where
Frisch elasticity is 0:5: Detrending uses HP-￿lter trend of log(ct) for mrs and and log(ct=yt) for
labor wedges. Shaded areas indicate NBER recession dates.
due to the lower volatility in mrs as measured by our model. The reduction in correlation
with output is about 22 percent at business cycle frequency. Note however, that a lower Frisch
elasticity increases the overall standard deviation in both wedges relative to high elasticity case.
Given that wages are not very volatile in the data, most macro models favor a high elasticity.
However, while in the prototype model the volatility of the mrs triples, the mrs volatility in
the low elasticity case is only 1.46 times the one in the prototype high elasticity case, which
makes the labor search model much more promising in reconciling micro and macro estimates.
25Figure 7: Prototype and search mrs and respective labor wedges, [1 ￿ "l;t] and [1 ￿ ￿l;t] where
Frisch elasticity is 0:5: All expressed as deviations from their respective HP-￿lter trend. Shaded
areas indicate NBER recession dates.
Table 2: Moments for Low Frisch Elasticity (0.5)




Std. Dev. 0.015 0.037 0.021 0.035 0.019
(0:015) (0:165) (0:082) (0:114) (0:052)
Corr(xt;xt￿1) 0.862 0.818 0.59 0.875 0.732
(0:862) (0:99) (0:971) (0:987) (0:962)
Cross Correlations
Yt Lt C=Y
[1 ￿ "l;t] 0.721 0.975 -0.452
(0:238) (0:998) (￿0:153)
(1 ￿ ￿l;t) 0.56 0.869 -0.283
(0:229) (0:813) (￿0:132)
All variables are HP-￿ltered, except Lt.
Moments in () are for the ￿ low-frequency￿case.
26So far, our comparison between the statistical properties of the two wedges points to a
potential misspeci￿cation in the prototype model. We can argue that an econometrician
measuring the labor wedge based on (36) might misinterpret some endogenous variation in
hours as variation in the labor wedge.
5.2 Mapping with the Simulated Data
The previous section has analyzed the labor wedge based solely on one equilibrium condition.
In this section, instead, we use the model as the data generating process and analyze what it
implies for the labor wedge of the prototype RBC model. More speci￿cally, we calibrate our
model and simulate arti￿cial data by shutting o⁄ all the exogenous shocks (and wedges) except
the e¢ ciency wedge, Zt, which means that [1 ￿ ￿l;t] will be constant at 0.6 over time. Then,
using the simulated data on consumption, output and labor, we measure a labor wedge as in
CKM using (36). Hence, the null hypothesis is no movements in the prototype labor wedge,
i.e., "l;t = :4 8t.
To calibrate parameters related to search frictions, we follow an approach that is similar to
Merz (1995) and Andolfatto (1996), and target ￿rst moments of the labor market variables, n
and h. We follow a standard approach for parameters that are not related to search frictions.
More speci￿cally, we set ￿ = 0:99, ￿ = 0:025, ￿ = 0:36. Note that 1￿￿ is not equal to labor￿ s
share because of the search frictions, but as long as the total recruiting costs is a relatively small
fraction of output, labor￿ s share is not far from 1￿￿. The total recruiting cost share, i.e. ￿v=y,
is set to 1:5 percent. We follow Merz (1995) and assume a strictly convex search cost function
c(e) = c0e￿, where c0 is normalized to 1 and the output share of search costs born by workers,
c(e)(1 ￿ n), is targeted to be 0:5 percent. Unfortunately, there is no guidance in the literature
over these parameters and we try to minimize the resource cost of search and recruitment
by this calibration. It turns out this is not far from what has been done in the literature
before and our results are not sensitive to the exact share of these costs (see Andolfatto 1996).
What is more sensitive is the parameter ￿, that determines the degree of convexity in cost of
workers￿search e⁄ort. As we have argued in section 4.4, in order to have a unique steady state
equilibrium we need to have enough convexity in this function. In particular, as ￿ converges
to 1 we will have multiplicity of equilibria. In our calibration ￿ is implied by the relative ratios
27of the search/recruitment costs in output, i.e. ￿ = 3:22 The elasticity of matching function
and bargaining power of workers (￿rms) are calibrated such that the Hosios (1990) condition
holds, which implies ￿ = ￿: The elasticity of job matches with respect to vacancies, ￿; is set to
0:5, which lies in the middle of the range of estimates reported by Petrongolo and Pissarides
(2001). The quarterly rate of transition from employment to non-employment, ￿, is set at 0:15,
following calibration of Andolfatto (1996) and references therein. Five parameters, ￿, ￿,  , ￿
and ￿ are calibrated to match ￿ve moments, ￿v=y = 0:015, c(e)(1 ￿ n)=y = 0:005, n = 0:7074,
h = 0:3752, and q = 0:9.23


























Simulated Series: Labor Wedge vs. Output
Lab. Wedge
Output
Figure 8: Labor wedge and output from the simulated data.
Figure (8) shows simulated output series and the prototype labor wedge derived under the
baseline calibration described above. The standard deviation of "L
t relative to output is 0.15
which makes the null hypothesis of no ￿ uctuations clearly rejected. In other words, this implies
that doing the business cycle accounting as in CKM would falsely detect the presence of a
labor wedge when reality is well described by the labor search model. Moreover, the correlation
22Our results are essentially the same when ￿ = 1:5.
23Note that in this quantitative exercise, shocks to the matching e¢ ciency are shut down, as well as ￿l and
g,. The latter two parameters are set to 2=5 and 0:16, respectively, following the avergaes in the data and the
measured labor wedge from the previous section. Our targets for n and h are the means for employment and
hours per worker, respectively. The calibration target for q follows from the average duration of a posted vacancy
based on van Ours and Ridder (1992).
28between the labor wedge is strongly procyclical with a correlation with output and total hours
of about 0.85 and 0.96, respectively. Hence, a simple extension of the prototype RBC model
with search frictions is consistent with a signi￿cantly procyclical labor wedge, which could be
entirely due to endogenous movements in both the extensive and the intensive margins. Those
results support the view that labor search frictions may induce endogenous ￿ uctuations in hours
and employment that will manifest themselves as a procyclical and variable labor wedge as in
CKM or Shimer (2009).
Table 3: Simulation Exercise
Simul. Data Actual Data
std([1 ￿ "l;t])=std(yt) 0.15 1.00
corr([1 ￿ "l;t];yt) 0.85 0.51
corr([1 ￿ "l;t];lt) 0.96 0.87
6 Conclusion
The business cycle accounting literature has identi￿ed the relation between the marginal pro-
ductivity of labor (mpl) and the marginal rate of substitution (mrs) as a weakness common to
many perfectly competitive RBC models. More precisely, the observed wedge between the mrs
and mpl seems to conceal one of the keys that would allow us to improve our understanding of
what drives economic cycles. This paper has explored the role of labor-market search models in
addressing that weakness and providing insights on the mechanisms that lead to business cycle
￿ uctuations.
Our results indicate that labor-market search frictions per se do not provide a mechanism
that could directly alter movements in the wedge between mpl and mrs, as observed in the data.
The main reason for this is that the bargaining process between ￿rms and workers internalize
search frictions through the wage decision, rather than hours decision.
Instead, the advantage of the labor-search model is due to its natural ability to distinguish
between ￿ uctuations in total hours and hours per worker, leaving no doubt on the fact that the
mrs has to be measured in terms of hours per worker. Since ￿ uctuations in employment account
for the majority of the movements in total hours, confounding hours per worker with total hours
29leads to a substantial mismeasurement of the mrs and, consequently, a serious misspeci￿cation
of the model which shows up as labor wedge. Our ￿ndings show that, at business cycle frequency,
about 20 percent of the observed volatility and most of the procyclicality of the labor wedge
can be attributed to ￿ uctuations in the extensive margin (employment) through their e⁄ect on
the mrs.
In addition to that, we also cast additional light on how the divergent ￿nding between macro
and micro estimates of the labor supply elasticity is exacerbated by the use of total hours in
the measurement of the mrs. The search model is able to take much lower values for the Frisch
elasticity without dramatically increasing the volatility of the mrs￿ which is the main reason
for why macro estimates give high values of the labor demand elasticity.
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33Appendix
A Data
We use data from NIPA tables to construct our measures for real output (yt), consumption (ct),
and government expenditures ("g;t), which also includes net exports24. Labor market variables,
employment (nt) and average hours per worker (ht) are taken from Cociuba, Prescott and
Ueberfeldt (2009). All the data are from 1959:Q2 to through 2010:Q3 and seasonally adjusted
at an annualized rate when relevant. Output yt and some of its components ct , and "g;t are
all de￿ ated by the GDP de￿ ator. Real output, yt, is de￿ned as the quarterly gross domestic
product net of sales taxes. Consumption, ct, is the sum of non-durable goods purchases and
services. Finally, government expenditures, "g;t, includes government consumption expenditures
(including federal, state and local governments) and net exports of goods and services. In e⁄ect,
we lump together government consumption and net exports. For the purpose of our exercises
in this paper, this distinction is not important. For the labor market data, we follow Cociuba,
Prescott and Ueberfeldt (2009) and use their data to incorporate military hours and employment
into total hours and total employment ￿gures as estimated by the Current Population Survey
of the BLS.
B Households￿Decision Problem
First order necessary conditions and costates for the household￿ s problem (15)-(16) are,


































Combining (38) and (40) will give the consumption Euler equation in (17). Note that equa-









t ) in (41) and taking expectations using (39) gives the households￿choice of
e⁄ort in (18).
C Firms￿Decision Problem
First order necessary conditions and costates for the ￿rms￿problem (19)-(20) are,
kt : ￿z;tfk(kt;ntht) ￿ rt = 0 (42)
















24We pulled this data from Haver Analytics database.
34Equation (42) gives us the equilibrium rental rate on capital in (21). Note that equation (43)






t ) = ￿





(44) and taking expectations using (42) gives the ￿rms￿choice of vacancies in (22).
D Details of Employment Contract
Employment contract is given by the solution to the problem de￿ned in (23). Note that we have
the necessary expressions for each party￿ s marginal surplus from respective decision problems.
Wh
nt(!t) is de￿ned in (41) and W
f
nt(!t) is de￿ned in (44).
Wh
nt(!h













As long as there are gains from trade, ￿rst order conditions are given by two conditions that







































where the cross-partial derivatives could be evaluated by using (45) and (46) to arrive at (24)
and (25) in the text. Then one can use the wage equation, (24), along with (45) and (46) to
derive an explicit wage equation in (26). To do so, multiply both sides of (45) with ￿ and (46)
with (1 ￿ ￿)Uc(ct)[1 ￿ ￿l;t].
￿Wh
n(!h
t ) = ￿Uc(ct)[wt [1 ￿ ￿lt]ht + c(e)] +




(1 ￿ ￿)Uc(ct)[1 ￿ ￿lt]Wf
n(!
f
t ) = (1 ￿ ￿)Uc(ct)[1 ￿ ￿l;t]["z;tfl(kt;ntht)ht ￿ wtht]















t ) and subtracting the second line
from the ￿rst with some additional algebra gives the wage equation expressed in (26). Finally,
it is straightforward to see that the optimality in hours from Nash bargaining problem implies
the labor wedge equation expressed in (30).
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